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THE ENTREPRENEURIAL ORIENTATION—PERFORMANCE RELATIONSHIP 
Abstract 
This paper applies a social exchange perspective to understand the internal contingencies of the 
relationship between entrepreneurial orientation (EO) and performance. It focuses on two aspects 
of social interactions among functional managers (procedural justice and trust), as well as on 
their organizational commitment, as potential enhancements to the firm’s successful exploitation 
of entrepreneurial opportunities. A study of 232 Canadian-based firms finds several positive 
moderating effects: The EO–performance link is stronger for higher levels of procedural justice, 
trust, and organizational commitment. In addition, consistent with a systems approach to 
organizational contingencies, the EO–performance relationship is stronger when the 
organization’s social context comes closer to an “ideal” configuration of procedural justice, trust, 
and organizational commitment that is most conducive to knowledge exchange within the 
organization. The study’s implications and future research directions are discussed. 
Key words: entrepreneurial orientation, social exchange theory, procedural justice, trust, 
organizational commitment 
1. Executive Summary 
This study examines the roles of social relationships between functional managers and 
their commitment to the organization in shaping the entrepreneurial orientation (EO)– 
performance relationship. In the context of prior studies that typically focus on the external 
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factors that affect the EO–performance relationship, as well as recent research that has begun to 
explore its internal contingencies, limited attention centers on how the successful exploitation of 
entrepreneurial opportunities might depend on social interactions within the firm. Because social 
exchanges are instrumental for the firm’s ability to combine knowledge across different 
functional areas, they can interfere in the successful enactment of the firm’s entrepreneurial 
posture. 
Drawing from prior work on social exchange relationships, we consider three 
characteristics that collectively represent an organization’s internal social context and that affect 
the extent and quality of internal knowledge exchange and thus the strength of the EO– 
performance relationship: (1) procedural justice in cross-functional relationships, (2) trust 
between functional managers, and (3) managers’ commitment to the organization and its goals. 
Examining a sample of 232 Canadian-based firms representing a broad range of industries, we 
find that the overall positive relationship between EO and performance becomes nuanced once 
we account for social exchange processes. In particular, the relationship is positive only at high 
levels of procedural justice, trust, and organizational commitment; it is further amplified to the 
extent that the organization’s social context approaches an “ideal” configuration of procedural 
justice, trust, and organizational commitment. 
This study contributes to entrepreneurship literature by drawing attention to and 
providing a theoretical elaboration of how the internal social context affects the EO–performance 
relationship. Specifically, internal social exchanges influence the firm’s ability to combine 
knowledge across functional boundaries, which in turn affect its ability to exploit new 
opportunities successfully. By discussing how cross-functional procedural justice and trust 
promote the quality of decision making when confronted with entrepreneurial opportunities, we 
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offer new insights into the role of formal and informal collaboration among functional 
departments for the successful implementation of a firm’s EO. Furthermore, we highlight how 
functional managers’ commitment to their organization can act as a catalyst to collaboration and 
knowledge exchange. By internalizing the entrepreneurial goals of their organizations, 
committed managers can enhance the cohesion and critical thinking that organizations require to 
realize their entrepreneurial potential. We also contribute to literature on entrepreneurial 
orientation by using a systems perspective to understand how internal social contingencies 
collectively help translate a firm’s entrepreneurial posture into successful performance. 
From a managerial point of view, this study suggests that when a firm seeks to adopt an 
entrepreneurial orientation, top managers should focus not only on navigating the external 
environment but also on ensuring that procedural justice and trust permeate the relationships 
between functional departments. Ultimately, strong social relationships might make functional 
managers less likely to identify themselves as marketers, salespeople, product designers, or 
engineers and instead encourage them to perceive each other as “partners” with common 
interests in identifying and exploiting entrepreneurial opportunities for the firm. Finally, by 
fostering commitment and inspiration throughout the ranks of the organization, top managers can 
create further impetus for cross-functional initiatives and collaboration that facilitate knowledge 
exchange and ultimately help fulfill the firm’s entrepreneurial potential. 
2. Introduction 
In changing and increasingly competitive environments, firms must constantly seek out 
entrepreneurial opportunities (D’Aveni, 1994) and translate them into improved performance 
outputs (Hitt et al., 2001). To this end, a firm’s entrepreneurial orientation (EO)—that is, its 
strategic posture to be innovative, proactive, and risk taking—takes on instrumental importance 
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(Covin and Slevin, 1991). Many studies demonstrate the beneficial influence of EO on firm 
performance (Wiklund, 1999; Wiklund and Shepherd, 2005; Zahra, 1991; Zahra and Covin, 
1995), but studies in which this relationship does not hold (Smart and Conant, 1994) and 
arguments for the lack of universal applicability of an entrepreneurial strategic posture (Hart, 
1992) have prompted further theoretical elaboration of the EO–performance relationship, 
highlighting its various contingencies (Lumpkin and Dess, 1996). Accordingly, a stream of 
studies reveals the moderating roles of external factors such as environmental hostility, 
turbulence, and dynamism (Covin and Covin, 1990; Dess et al., 1997; Namen and Slevin, 1993; 
Wiklund and Shepherd, 2005), external networks (Lee et al., 2001; Stam and Elfring, 2008), and 
national culture (Arbaugh et al., 2005). 
Yet for entrepreneurial orientation to result in performance advantages, it also needs to be 
properly and successfully managed within the organization (Covin et al., 2006; Miller and 
Friesen, 1986), which involves exploiting opportunities through the development and 
deployment of resources across organizational units (Ireland et al., 2003; Kuratko et al., 2005). 
Therefore, understanding how firms can enable and effectively implement their entrepreneurial 
orientation also requires consideration of internal organizational processes (Lumpkin and Dess, 
1996; Wiklund and Shepherd, 2005) and the leveraging of resources such as knowledge across 
functional departments (Floyd and Lane, 2000). In this regard, apart from the roles of the firm’s 
resources (Wiklund and Shepherd, 2005), market orientation (Bhuian et al., 2005), and strategy 
formation process (Covin et al., 2006), the social aspects of the effective exploitation of 
entrepreneurial opportunities, which enable and promote knowledge exchange within the 
organization, have largely remained unexplored. Notably, social exchanges underlie the 
organization’s capability to combine effectively the knowledge embedded in different functional 
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areas (De Luca and Atuahene-Gima, 2007) and are particularly conducive to entrepreneurial 
behavior when internal relationships are characterized by fairness, trust, and organizational 
support (Hornsby et al., 2002, Kim and Mauborgne, 1998; Kuratko et al., 2005). Hence, we pose 
the following research question: How does firms’ internal social context influence their ability to 
exploit entrepreneurial opportunities? 
To address this question, we consider the intricate interplay between the content of a 
firm’s strategic posture (i.e., entrepreneurial orientation) and the social processes within the 
firm’s borders (Covin et al., 2006). Specifically, we focus on the interactions and attitudes of 
mid-level, functional managers (Hornsby et al., 2002; Kuratko et al., 2005), who oversee the sub-
processes through which an organization’s higher-level, strategic decisions get implemented 
(Burgelman, 1983; Floyd and Lane, 2000; Floyd and Wooldridge, 1997) and thus epitomize the 
enactment of a firm’s entrepreneurial posture (Kuratko et al., 2005). From their unique position 
to evaluate and re-direct knowledge flows within the organization (Kanter, 1985) and their 
engagement in social interactions that affect the volume and quality of knowledge flows (De 
Clercq and Sapienza, 2006; Floyd and Lane, 2000), these managers play instrumental roles in the 
exploitation of entrepreneurial opportunities (Floyd and Wooldridge, 1997; Mom et al., 2007). 
Consistent with prior work that highlights the influence of procedural justice (Sapienza 
and Korsgaard, 1996), trust (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998), and organizational commitment 
(Kim, 1998) on effective knowledge sharing in social exchange relationships, we focus on how 
these three social exchange processes influence the EO–performance relationship. We argue that 
procedural justice, trust, and organizational commitment each facilitate the firm's ability to 
exploit entrepreneurial opportunities by enhancing the amount and quality of knowledge 
exchange across functional departments (De Clercq and Sapienza, 2006). In addition, these three 
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factors collectively constitute a conceptually meaningful gestalt (Covin et al., 2006; Miller, 1986) 
that reflects how the organization’s internal social context can influence the exploitation of 
entrepreneurial opportunities (Kim and Mauborgne, 1998). To this end, we apply a systems 
perspective to understanding the contingent influence of social context (Drazin and Van de Ven, 
1985) and focus on the holistic configuration of its characteristics (Govindarajan, 1988; Ketchen 
et al., 1993; 1997; Meyer et al., 1993; Payne, 2006). To the extent that an “ideal” configuration 
of factors aligns best with the implementation requirements of a particular strategic posture (e.g., 
Venkatraman, 1989; Vorhies and Morgan, 2003), the similarity to that configuration reflects how 
easily that posture may be converted into organizational effectiveness (Doty et al., 1993; 
Govindarajan, 1988). Accordingly, we identify and discuss an “ideal” configuration of 
procedural justice, trust, and organizational commitment that is most conducive to cross-
functional knowledge exchange and, because of the critical role of such exchanges for exploiting 
entrepreneurial opportunities, argue that organizations with a closer adherence to this 
configuration will exhibit a stronger relationship between their EO and performance. 
3. Theoretical background 
3.1. EO and knowledge exchange 
We define a firm’s entrepreneurial orientation (EO) as a strategic posture that involves a 
propensity to be innovative, that is, to depart from established practices and entertain new ideas 
and experimentation; proactive, in that it beats competitors to new market opportunities; and 
open to risk in exploring new products, services, and markets (Covin and Slevin, 1991). For this 
posture to translate into successful performance, firms must leverage resources across functional 
departments to create the conditions for the effective exploitation of opportunities (Eisenhardt 
and Martin, 2000; Floyd and Lane, 2000; Teece et al., 1997; Zollo and Winter, 2002). Indeed, 
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after establishing the viability of entrepreneurial opportunities, the firm then should shift its 
focus from exploring to exploiting opportunities (Choi et al., 2008). 
Successful opportunity exploitation requires the full-scale operation and implementation 
of new approaches (Choi and Shepherd, 2004) and the development of commercialization 
strategies (Zahra and George, 2002). Assembling and combining dispersed, complementary 
knowledge can play a critical role in this process (Choi et al., 2008; Floyd and Lane, 2000), but 
such combination does not happen automatically. On the one hand, entrepreneurial opportunities 
are surrounded by uncertainty about how different internal stakeholders may contribute to the 
development or launch of new products or services in the marketplace (Shepherd et al., 2000). 
On the other hand, knowledge that can help reduce this uncertainty is dispersed across the 
organization (Tsoukas, 1996) and may be perceived as a source of power, that is therefore not 
readily shared (Kim and Mauborgne, 1998). 
Leveraging knowledge to exploit entrepreneurial opportunities therefore may require 
close social relationships among the parties who hold the relevant knowledge (Floyd and Lane, 
2000). Indeed, “although ideas are formed in the minds of individuals, the interaction between 
individuals typically plays a critical role in developing these ideas” (Nonaka, 1994: 15), and 
through the social nature of exchange relationships, the knowledge benefits inherent in such 
relationships—in terms of both the volume and the quality of knowledge—can be unlocked (De 
Clercq and Sapienza, 2006). Accordingly, we argue that the firm’s ability to convert its 
innovative, proactive, and risk-taking behavior into a performance advantage will be influenced 
by the amount and quality of knowledge exchange that takes place across functional 
departments. Ultimately, because this knowledge exchange is embedded in the organization’s 
patterns of social exchange (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998), examining the moderating influence 
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of social exchange processes within the firm should enrich our understanding of the EO– 
performance relationship (Covin et al., 2008). 
3.2. EO and social exchange processes 
Social exchange theory regards exchange relationships as predicated on norms of 
reciprocity and mutual attraction (Emerson, 1981). Economic action is embedded in social 
relations that balance the search for self-interested gain with the development of sustainable 
relationships (Granovetter, 1985). In the context of cross-functional cooperation within 
organizations, the nature of these relationships represents a resource that may benefit the 
exchange partners (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998). For instance, the social capital developed 
between departments is a relational resource that resides in interactions between functional 
managers and is instrumental for the effectiveness of the organization’s internal operation (Leana 
and Van Buren, 1999; Tsai and Ghoshal, 1998). Social relationships between functional 
departments create a context conducive to novel ideas and new knowledge (Nahapiet and 
Ghoshal, 1998), and such knowledge exchange in turn can increase managers’ effectiveness in 
exploiting opportunities (Floyd and Lane, 2000; Mom et al., 2007). 
A social exchange perspective should help identify the factors that help leverage the 
firm’s internal resources across functional departments in ways that affect the successful 
exploitation of entrepreneurial opportunities. Drawing on the notion that the combination of 
resources in exchange relationships can be optimized through procedural justice (Sapienza and 
Korsgaard, 1996), trust (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998), and commitment (Kim, 1998), we focus 
on three specific processes that characterize the firm’s internal social context: (1) the perceived 
fairness of the procedures governing the relationships between functional departments, (2) the 
trust that functional managers hold in each other, and (3) their identification with the 
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organization and its goals. The glue that binds these variables is their ability to substitute for 
more formal, restrictive governance mechanisms of exchanges within the organization and, as 
such, to increase the organization’s ability to benefit from extensive and high-quality knowledge 
exchange within its borders (De Clercq and Sapienza, 2006; Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998). We 
first discuss the individual moderating effects of these three social exchange processes on the 
EO–performance relationship. Next, in line with a systems perspective on organizational 
contingencies (Drazin and Van de Ven, 1985; Govindarajan, 1988; Vorhies and Morgan, 2003), 
we consider how more complex, holistic configurations of these constructs can influence the 
effectiveness of the firm’s EO. Figure 1 illustrates our conceptual framework. 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
3.2.1. Procedural justice 
Because organizational members devote significant energy to understanding how their 
organization operates and participating in the social processes within it, their perceptions of 
fairness are important in shaping their motives and behavior (Cropanzano and Greenberg, 1997). 
We define procedural justice as the perception by functional managers that the procedures that 
govern their relationships with peers in other departments are fair (Lind and Tyler, 1988; Thibaut 
and Walker, 1975). Procedural justice is relevant for the distribution of rewards (e.g., Folger and 
Konovsky, 1989) and enhances managers’ compliance with the strategic direction of the 
organization (Kim and Mauborgne, 1998). Procedural justice also helps ensure harmony in and 
the longevity of work relationships and is particularly instrumental in situations that require co-
operation between parties with different goals, such as in the context of cross-functional 
collaboration (De Luca and Atuahene-Gima 2007). When functional managers believe that top 
management tries to be fair and deal equitably with them, they may be more willing to share 
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their resources with others across the organization (Korsgaard et al., 1995). More broadly, the 
procedural fairness of organizational decisions can motivate organizational members to put their 
self-interest aside and instead focus on the good of the organization as a whole (Lind and Tyler, 
1988). 
On the basis of this literature, we argue that the beneficial effect of EO on performance 
should increase when high levels of procedural justice characterize the relationships between 
functional managers. First, procedural justice amplifies the performance effect of an EO because 
it enhances the amount of knowledge shared across functional departments, as implied by the 
possibility to voice and articulate opinions in decision processes (Kim and Mauborgne, 1998). 
Although entrepreneurial initiatives can change the balance of power within the organization 
(Burgelman, 1983), and individual managers might thus be reluctant to share their knowledge 
and resources with others, this reluctance will be overcome to the extent that they believe that the 
benefits from sharing knowledge will be fairly rewarded across functional departments (Kuratko 
et al., 2005). 
Second, procedural justice amplifies the performance effect of an EO by increasing the 
quality of knowledge exchange. The presence of fair procedures implies that mechanisms are in 
place to question and refute others’ opinions (Kim and Mauborgne, 1998), which in turn should 
enhance the creativity and diversity of ideas exchanged across functional departments. Fair 
procedures imply accountability among functional managers in terms of explaining how they 
adhere to these procedures, which provides them with a more comprehensive understanding of 
the cognitive maps of others in the organization (Kim and Mauborgne, 1998). Also, fair 
procedures across functional departments make functional managers more open to making risky 
decisions, in that such procedures guarantee that the interests of an individual department will 
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not be jeopardized, even if risky endeavors do not immediately succeed in the marketplace 
(Hornsby et al., 2002; Sapienza and Korsgaard, 1996). Procedural justice thus increases 
confidence that, in the long run, each department’s functional interests will be advanced even if 
the necessary decisions create uncertainty in the short term. On the basis of these arguments, we 
advance the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1. The positive relationship between EO and performance is moderated by 
procedural justice, such that this positive relationship is stronger at higher levels of 
procedural justice. 
3.2.2. Trust 
A central premise of social exchange literature is that the presence of mutual trust in 
exchange relationships is beneficial for the outcomes of such relationships (Granovetter, 1985). 
Trust thus represents another key aspect of the social exchanges that take place between 
functional managers. It can pertain to functional managers’ beliefs and expectations about 
others’ good intentions (Sitkin and Roth, 1993), reliability and predictability (Ring and Van de 
Ven, 1992), and positive motives in situations entailing risk and vulnerability (Boon and Holmes, 
1991). In other words, trust is particularly relevant in uncertain and risky situations, because it 
instills a willingness to render oneself vulnerable to the actions of trusted others. Within 
organizations, trust facilitates access to and combinations of resources, as well as regular and 
open knowledge exchanges among organizational units (Ireland et al., 2003; Tsai and Ghoshal, 
1998). When trust exists between potential partners, they are more likely to engage in exchange 
and cooperation (Ring and Van de Ven, 1992), by “keeping [their] mind open to all evidence, 
[and] secur[ing] communication and dialogue” (Misztal, 1996: 10). Because such stimulation of 
knowledge exchange is essential for the exploitation of entrepreneurial opportunities, as we 
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argued previously, we offer several reasons for a strengthened EO–performance relationship 
when high trust exists between managers in different functional departments. 
First, trust amplifies the performance effect of an EO because it stimulates the amount of 
knowledge exchange between functional departments. When cross-functional relationships are 
governed by trust in each other’s goodwill, the reliance on monitoring mechanisms becomes less 
relevant (Bstieler, 2006), which frees resources that then can enhance the potential for more 
extensive communication (Zaheer et al., 1998). Further, cross-functional collaboration induced 
by trust relies on functional managers’ intrinsic motivations rather than external sanctions to 
collaborate with colleagues (Zaheer et al., 1998). Driven by such motivations, managers are 
more likely to do everything it takes—including extensive resource sharing and intensive 
championing of their own or others’ projects—to see entrepreneurial opportunities through and 
support their implementation in day-to-day operations (Goldsby et al., 2005). 
Second, trust makes the EO–performance relationship stronger by increasing the quality 
of the knowledge exchange between functional departments. Trust facilitates the exchange of 
confidential information among functional managers because it diminishes the perceived risk of 
opportunism and thus the need to veil or hide sensitive information (Yli-Renko et al., 2001). In 
the same vein, sharing tacit knowledge in particular is a form of relinquishing power to others 
(Kim and Mauborgne, 1998), and therefore, it may take high levels of trust for functional 
managers to share such knowledge with their colleagues. Also, low perceptions of opportunism 
make functional managers more likely to exchange insights not only about each other’s prior 
successes but also failures (De Clercq and Sapienza, 2006), which increases the learning 
advantages that can be derived from the exchanges (Argote, 1996). Finally, trust reduces fears of 
criticism or looking foolish (Atuahene-Gima and Murray, 2007), so it also enhances the 
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willingness of functional managers to implement risky actions and increases the scope of ideas 
about how to convert entrepreneurial opportunities into action (Mom et al., 2007). 
Hypothesis 2. The positive relationship between EO and performance is moderated by 
trust, such that this positive relationship is stronger at higher levels of trust. 
3.2.3. Organizational commitment 
The notion of organizational commitment conceives of functional managers as having an 
exchange relationship with their organization (Eisenberger et al., 1986; Gakovic and Tetrick, 
2003), and this relationship in turn plays an important role in managers’ day-to-day behavior 
(Allen and Meyer, 1990). We define organizational commitment as the extent to which 
functional managers identify with their organization and are committed to its goals (Pool and 
Pool, 2007). It is thus a work attitude that reflects a willingness to work hard to achieve 
organizational goals (Meyer et al., 2004). In the context of this study, organizational 
commitment reflects managers’ belief in and acceptance of their organization’s entrepreneurial 
goals and values. Because managers’ organizational commitment increases their perception of 
the opportunities for knowledge exchange with others in the organization (Kim, 1998), it can be 
particularly relevant for the successful realization of the firm’s EO. 
First, organizational commitment enhances the performance potential of an EO because it 
increases the amount of knowledge exchange between functional departments. Individual 
managers who feel a strong attachment to their organization are likely to share more knowledge 
with others because such an attachment increases their perception that extensive knowledge 
sharing is appreciated and that their knowledge eventually will be used by and helpful for their 
organization (Van den Hooff and Van Weenen, 2004). Similarly, strongly committed managers 
attach substantial importance to how they are perceived by others in the organization (O’Reilly 
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and Chatman, 1986) and thus are less likely to appear resistant to sharing knowledge with them 
(Lin, 2007). Organizational commitment may lead functional managers’ motivations to change 
from being extrinsic (i.e., concerned about the firm’s needs) to being intrinsic (i.e., concerned 
about my firm’s needs; Meyer et al., 2004) and increase the passion with which they engage in 
cross-functional knowledge exchange (Emden et al., 2005). Ultimately, because the fruitful 
exploitation of entrepreneurial opportunities requires a combination of knowledge across 
functional boundaries (Floyd and Lane, 2000), extensive knowledge exchange increases the odds 
that relevant pieces of knowledge can be matched. 
Second, organizational commitment amplifies the performance effects of an EO by 
increasing the quality of knowledge exchange within the organization. Interactions between 
parties that identify strongly with the organization can lead to increased organizational learning, 
as these interactions involve not only repeated efforts to exchange information (Blankenburg et 
al., 1999) but also greater receptivity of exchange partners’ knowledge (Van den Hooff and Van 
Weenen, 2004). Further, the organization’s learning capacity may increase when its members are 
highly committed to its goals because the associated efforts to use the knowledge to accomplish 
these goals enhance insights into how disparate pieces of knowledge can be effectively combined 
(De Clercq and Sapienza, 2006). For instance, Emden et al. (2005) find a positive effect of the 
level of commitment on the amount of learning that takes place in exchange relationships, which 
they explain as stemming from the scope of activities and resources deployed in the relationships. 
In short, highly committed managers are more likely to exchange a richer set of knowledge with 
one another, which can be leveraged as the organization’s ability to exploit entrepreneurial 
opportunities. 
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Hypothesis 3. The positive relationship between EO and performance is moderated by 
the level of organizational commitment, such that this positive relationship is stronger at 
higher levels of commitment. 
3.3. Configurations of social exchange processes 
Hypotheses 1–3 pertain to the individual moderating effects of procedural justice, trust, 
and organizational commitment on the EO–performance relationship and offer a reductionist 
portrayal, based on their independent, decomposable effects. That is, they consider the 
knowledge-enhancing effect of each of the three factors individually, without acknowledging the 
possibility that this effect may be not be optimal if any of the other factors is deficient (Drazin 
and Van de Ven, 1985). Yet to the extent that these aspects of social context operate 
simultaneously and represent a holistic structure, a systems approach to understanding their 
contingency effects offers valuable complementary insights (Vorhies and Morgan, 2003). 
Several studies show that the examination of a configuration of contingencies can increase 
understanding of the simultaneous performance effects of multiple organizational characteristics 
(Dess et al., 1997; Govindarajan, 1988; Miller, 1986; Vorhies and Morgan, 2003; Wiklund and 
Shepherd, 2005). The basic premise of this configurational perspective is that firms that align 
multiple, performance-enhancing factors enjoy superior performance (Dess et al., 1997). 
The holistic configuration of organizational characteristics can be modeled as an “ideal 
type” construct, an abstract representation of related, complex empirical phenomena (Burger, 
1987; Weber, 1904). Such “ideal types describe the phenomena, consisting of component 
elements standing in specific relations to each other, which empirically exist when certain 
conditions are fulfilled” (Burger, 1987: 159). Ideal type constructs are particularly useful in 
representing interactions among several theoretical constructs (Stinchcombe, 1968). They 
represent a unique form of theory building and are of great relevance for researching the 
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complexity of business-related behavior (Doty and Glick, 1994). Specifically, the systems 
approach to organizational contingencies suggests that the more an organization deviates from 
the ideal type, the lesser is its expected effectiveness (Drazin and Van de Ven, 1985; Ketchen et 
al., 1993, 1997). 
We have argued that the organization’s internal social context—as represented by the 
existence of procedural justice, trust, and organizational commitment—affects functional 
managers’ ability to institute effective knowledge exchange within the organization, which 
should be essential for the organization to realize the potential that is inherent in its EO. In this 
sense, the “ideal” social context pertains to the situation in which the individual components of 
the social context take their most beneficial forms with respect to the volume and quality of 
knowledge exchange (De Clercq and Sapienza, 2006; Floyd and Lane, 2000) and, consequently, 
the successful exploitation of entrepreneurial opportunities. In turn, to the extent that 
organizations do not reach that ideal state, their internal social context may hamper the effective 
leveraging of knowledge for opportunity exploitation. Such friction in knowledge exchange thus 
relates to the degree to which the internal social context deviates from the “ideal” configuration 
(Doty and Glick, 1994); higher deviation can undermine the implementation of the firm’s EO 
(Venkatraman, 1989). 
On the basis of these arguments, we hypothesize that the relationship between EO and 
performance is stronger when the organization’s social context comes closer to the “ideal” 
configuration of procedural justice, trust, and organizational commitment. To be precise, we 
contend that these elements—in addition to individually affecting the amount and nature of 
knowledge exchange—reinforce one another in promoting knowledge flows within the 
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organization and thus turning an entrepreneurial orientation into successful performance (Kim 
and Mauborgne, 1998). We offer several arguments to support this claim. 
First, combined procedural justice and trust might enhance the effect of knowledge 
exchange among functional departments in terms of improved implementations of 
entrepreneurial opportunities. When functional managers believe others in the organization will 
not misuse shared knowledge to advance their own interests, they can more effectively use fair 
procedures for the promotion of knowledge sharing (De Cremer and Tyler, 2007), which itself 
helps overcome the inevitable challenges of opportunity commercialization processes. In other 
words, in light of the uncertainty associated with conducting entrepreneurial initiatives (Lumpkin 
and Dess, 1996), perceptions of other functional managers as trustworthy, benevolent, and 
willing to protect the interests of others may make the presence of fair procedures even more 
effective in facilitating knowledge exchange, because they induce expectations of reciprocation 
and adherence to established rules (Lewicki and Bunker, 1996). These conditions likely ensure 
the proper recognition and appreciation of efforts by organizational members (Kim and 
Mauborgne, 1998), prompting them to be forthcoming with the information and knowledge that 
allows the firm to exploit its entrepreneurial opportunities. 
Second, procedural justice and organizational commitment can mutually enhance the 
extent and benefits of cross-functional knowledge exchange for the successful implementation of 
entrepreneurial opportunities. That is, the knowledge benefits that functional managers can 
derive from fair procedures with other departments for the pursuit of entrepreneurial initiatives 
will be amplified to the extent that they exhibit a strong identification with the organizations’ 
goals (Leong et al., 1994). People who are more favorably disposed toward positive reciprocity 
with others and their organization respond more favorably to fair treatment and are more 
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motivated to endorse and enforce fair procedures (Eisenberger et al., 2004). In such cases, 
managers not only internalize the organization’s goals and seek cooperation throughout the 
organization (Lin, 2007), but they also are confident that their engagement in open and regular 
knowledge exchanges with colleagues will be recognized and rewarded. Because the enactment 
of the organization’s EO requires wide support from within the organization (Lumpkin and Dess, 
1996), and because maintaining just dealings across functional departments exemplifies concern 
for the organization’s overall well-being rather than that of individual departments (Kim and 
Mauborgne, 1998), procedural justice should be particularly instrumental for the successful 
execution of an EO when it is maintained by committed managers who have the organization’s 
best interests at heart. 
Third, the connections of trust and organizational commitment should empower the 
knowledge exchange that underlies the successful pursuit of entrepreneurial opportunities. 
Knowledge advantages derive from trust-based relationships (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998), and 
they should become amplified at higher levels of organizational commitment, because managers 
committed to the organization are more motivated to leverage the knowledge advantages inherent 
to a trusting relationship to accomplish the often challenging organizational goals associated with 
an EO (Kim, 1998; Lumpkin and Dess, 1996). In addition, though high levels of trust can 
suppress exchanges of opposing viewpoints about the best way to implement new products or 
services—as a means to protect others’ short-term emotional well-being (Langfred, 2004)—such 
suppression may be less likely if functional managers keep the organization’s mission and goals 
in mind. Highly committed managers are willing to make short-term sacrifices to realize long-
term entrepreneurial goals for the good of the organization (Pool and Pool, 2007). 
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In short, a configuration characterized by the simultaneous presence of high levels of 
procedural justice, trust, and organizational commitment appears best for intra-organizational 
knowledge exchange, which underlies the successful implementation of entrepreneurial 
opportunities. Because frictionless knowledge sharing supports such implementation efforts 
(Floyd and Lane, 2000), this configuration reflects an internal social context that amplifies the 
performance potential of an EO. Consistent with a systems approach to organizational 
contingencies (Dess et al., 1997; Drazin and Van de Ven, 1985), we argue that the more closely 
an organization’s social context reflects the “ideal” configuration of high procedural justice, 
trust, and organizational commitment, the more able it can convert its EO into successful 
performance. In contrast, deviation from this ideal configuration should impede knowledge 
exchange and thus undermine the relationship between EO and performance. 
Hypothesis 4. The similarity of the organization’s social context to the ideal 
configuration of procedural justice, trust, and organizational commitment positively 
moderates the relationship between EO and performance, such that the relationship is 
stronger when the similarity is higher. 
4. Method 
4.1. Sample and data collection 
To test our hypotheses, we extracted all firms included in Hoover’s Business Directory 
headquartered in Canada, then retrieved a random sample of 1,500 firms based on their 
alphabetical appearance in the database. These firms are active across the country’s provinces 
and represent all sectors of Canada’s economy. For each firm, we obtained contact information 
about managers active in functional departments, such as R&D, engineering, marketing, or sales. 
We then sent a survey instrument to one randomly selected functional manager per firm. To 
pretest the survey and ensure that our questions were clear and understandable, we undertook 
informal interviews with six randomly chosen functional managers, not included in the initial 
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sample, with whom we discussed the survey instrument as well as the challenges associated with 
cross-functional cooperation in their respective firms. When necessary, we adapted the wording 
in the original survey instrument. 
We used Dillman’s (1978, 2000) total design method to manage our data collection. 
Specifically, we prepared a mailing packet containing (1) a cover letter addressed personally to 
the functional managers of the sampled firms, (2) a questionnaire, and (3) a postage-paid return 
envelope. Two weeks after the initial electronic mailing, we conducted “thank you” calls to those 
who had responded and reminder calls to those who had not. Four weeks after the initial mailing, 
we sent replacement questionnaires to non-respondents. The initial and follow-up invitation 
letters included a Web address that allowed the respondents to fill out the survey online if they 
wished to do so. Some initially selected firms were unfit for the final sample because they were 
not active any more, had moved and their new address could not be identified, or no longer 
employed the selected respondents. We therefore finished with 950 potential respondents and 
received 232 completed surveys, representing a response rate of 24%. The responding firms 
operate in a wide variety of sectors, including automotive and aviation (4.7%), biotechnology 
(4.3%), building and construction (4.3%), chemical and pharmaceutical (7.3%), computers 
(12.0%), consumer products (4.7%), food (4.7%), mining and exploration (9.9%), services 
(8.6%), telecommunications (7.8%), and others. Furthermore, 47.4% of the respondents work in 
R&D-related functions (R&D or engineering) and 52.6% in marketing-related functions 
(marketing or sales). With respect to the variables used in the study, no significant differences 
appear between early and late respondents (Armstrong and Overton, 1977) or between responses 
to the mail-based versus Web-based surveys (Dillman, 2000). 
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Following prior research (Yli-Renko et al., 2001), we tested the validity of the study’s 
key constructs by sending a follow-up survey after a six-month time lag. In the follow-up survey, 
we used a shortened format of the original questionnaire; for each construct, we chose one proxy 
item from the original survey that we believed best represented the overall construct. We 
received 78 responses to the follow-up survey and found that all validation items had positive, 
significant correlations with the original measures, as reported subsequently. 
4.2. Measures of constructs 
In Table 1, we list the measures and their associated alphas, construct reliability, average 
variance extracted (AVE), and factor loadings. All items were derived from previously 
established scales. 
Insert Table 1 here 
4.2.1. Performance 
The performance measure is the average of nine financial, operations, and marketing 
indicators used in prior research examining the relationship between firms’ strategic posture and 
performance (Li and Atuahene-Gima, 2001), capturing items such as return on investment, 
overall efficiency of operations, and market share growth. For each indicator, respondents 
assessed their perceptions of the firm’s performance relative to its principal competitors during 
the past three years. The measure (alpha = .92) correlated positively with its single-item 
counterpart from the follow-up survey (r = .66, p < .001). We also find that it correlates 
positively with income growth over the last year (r = .246, p < .05), according to data available 
in Hoover’s Business Directory with a subset of 70 firms. 
4.2.2. Entrepreneurial orientation 
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We use the seven-item scale validated by Miller (1983) to gauge EO, capturing the firm’s 
innovation (e.g., emphasis on long-term R&D), proactiveness (e.g., challenging rather than 
responding to major competitors), and risk taking (e.g., rewarding risk taking). The measure 
(alpha = .81) correlates positively with its single-item counterpart from the follow-up survey (r = 
.57, p < .001). 
4.2.3. Procedural justice 
Following Masterson (2001) and Moorman (1991), we adapted a previously validated 
scale to assess the fairness of procedures governing relationships across functional departments. 
For example, we assessed whether procedures allowed for requests for clarification or additional 
information about a decision. Given the importance of exchanges between R&D-related (R&D, 
engineering) and marketing-related functions (marketing, sales) for the successful 
implementation of organizational strategy (De Luca and Atuahene-Gima, 2007), the questions 
assessed the presence of fair procedures between R&D and engineering on the one hand and 
marketing and sales on the other. This measure (alpha = .89) shows a positive correlation with its 
counterpart from the follow-up survey (r = .27, p < .05). 
4.2.4. Trust 
Drawing on literature on interpersonal (Rempel et al., 1986) and interfirm (Yli-Renko et 
al., 2001) trust, we adapted a previously validated scale to assess the level of trust between 
managers across functional departments. Respondents indicated, for example, whether people 
from other functions kept their promises and avoided taking advantage of them, even if the 
opportunity arose. Similar to procedural justice, these questions assessed the presence of trust 
between R&D-related and marketing-related functions. The measure (alpha = .88) has a positive 
correlation with its counterpart from the follow-up survey (r = .37, p < .01). 
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4.2.5. Organizational commitment 
We used Allen and Meyer’s (1990) four-item scale to measure organizational 
commitment, assessing, for instance, the extent to which functional managers believe that people 
in their organization feel a strong belonging to the organization or would be happy to spend the 
rest of their career with the company.1 The measure (alpha = .91) has a positive correlation with 
its counterpart in the follow-up survey (r = .34, p < .001). 
4.2.6. Similarity to ideal configuration 
Ideal type patterns among variables can be generated either theoretically or empirically 
(Doty and Glick, 1994; Van de ven and Drazin, 1985). When clear judgments can be made about 
the ideal values of each component construct, the theoretical approach is most consistent with the 
logical structure of typological theories (Doty and Glick, 1994). In addition, empirical 
approaches require arbitrary decisions about what constitutes high performance and may reduce 
the statistical power for testing hypotheses (Govindarajan, 1988). Therefore, we used a 
theoretical approach to specify the ideal configuration of procedural justice, trust, and 
organizational commitment. The three constructs were measured on the same 1–5 scale, so we 
judged the highest value (5) as representing the most beneficial empirical representation of each 
construct. The ideal configuration thus constitutes the combination in which these three 
constructs obtain their highest values. Consistent with prior work (Doty et al., 1993; Drazin and 
Van de Ven, 1985; Govindarajan, 1988; Vorhies and Morgan, 2003), we calculated the 
Euclidean distance of each firm from this ideal configuration. We then converted this distance 
1 A common operationalization of organizational commitment involves Meyer and Allen’s (1991) distinction among 
affective, normative, and continuance subcomponents: Affective commitment pertains to employees’ emotional 
bond with their organization, normative commitment reflects the belief that loyalty to an employer is an obligation 
and thus something an employee “ought” to do, and continuance commitment pertains to understanding the costs of 
leaving the organization and thus the “need” to continue employment. The items used herein capture affective 
commitment, as this form of commitment aligns with our focus on the role of the social exchange relationship 
between functional managers and their organization (Allen and Meyer, 1990). 
24 
into its opposite, negative value to represent it as similarity to the ideal configuration (i.e., higher 
values reflect higher similarity). Formally, our measure of similarity to the ideal configuration 
can be summarized as Sim(i) = -!"(Xij - Xmj)2, where Xij represents the value of attribute j 
(procedural justice, trust, or organizational commitment) for firm i, and Xmj represents the 
maximum (i.e., ideal) value for that attribute. 
4.2.7. Control variables 
We included several control variables to ensure proper model specification and take into 
account possible alternative explanations for performance variations. In particular, we included 
several firm-level variables such as firm size, measured as a log transformation of the number of 
full-time employees; firm age, or the number of years the firm had been in business; and type of 
operations, an indicator of whether the firm focused on manufacturing versus services. 
Furthermore, we controlled for the respondents’ gender, measured with a dummy variable; 
company tenure, measured in years; and functional area, measured as whether the respondent 
represented a R&D- or marketing-related function. 
4.3. Assessing the reliability and validity of measures 
In line with Anderson and Gerbing (1988), we estimate the (five-factor) measurement 
model using AMOS 6.0.. Through a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA), we find factor loadings 
greater than .40, normalized residuals of less than 2.58, and modification indices of less than 
3.84 (Anderson and Gerbing, 1988). These parameters suggest that we do not need to delete 
scale items to improve model fit. The measurement model provides an acceptable fit to the data: 
!2(395) = 668.49, goodness-of-fit index (GFI) = .90, Tucker-Lewis index (TLI) = .94, 
confirmatory fit index (CFI) = .94, and root mean squared error of approximation (RMSEA) = 
.05. Table 1 contains the reliability and validity estimates (Cronbach’s alpha, composite 
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reliability, and average variance extracted [AVE]), as well as fit indices (GFI, TLI, CFI, 
RMSEA, and square root mean residual [SRMR]) for the different multi-item constructs. 
Furthermore, the CFA for a single-factor model does not fit the data well (!2(405) = 2131.12, GFI 
= .54, TLI = .57, CFI = .61, RMSEA = .14), which confirms the superior fit of the five-factor 
model and alleviates concerns about common method bias. 
To further assess common method bias, we compare several pairs of structural equation 
models in which we pair a model that includes an interaction term with another model in which 
we add a common method factor (Podsakoff et al., 2003; Song et al., 2006). For instance, for the 
structural equation model (SEM) that includes the EO # procedural justice interaction (i.e., the 
equivalent of Model 4, Table 3), the comparison reveals virtually no differences in the fit indices 
between the model without the common method factor ($2(42) = 81.72; GFI = .95, TLI = .88, CFI 
= .92, RMSEA = .06) and the corresponding model that adds a common method factor ($2(41) = 
81.71; GFI = .95, TLI = .87, CFI = .92, RMSEA = .07). The chi-square difference between the 
two models is not significant (%!2(1) = .01; ns), and only small changes in the size and 
significance of the paths across the two models emerge. The same pattern of results emerges for 
the SEM equivalents of the models in which the other two-way interactions are included. These 
results, together with arguments that common method bias is less prevalent in studies that use 
highly educated respondents and multi-item scales (Bergkvist and Rossiter, 2007) or focus on 
moderating rather than main effects (Simons and Peterson, 2000), alleviate the possible concerns 
related to the use of a common respondent in our study.  
The scales indicate convergent validity: The factor loadings are significant in the 
measurement model (t > 2.0; Gerbing and Anderson, 1988), and the AVE estimates are greater 
than or equal to .50 (Bagozzi and Yi, 1988), both when all constructs appear simultaneously in 
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the measurement model (Table 1) and when we perform CFAs on each of the constructs 
individually. With regard to the discriminant validity among the constructs, none of the 
confidence intervals for the correlations between constructs includes 1.0 (p < .05) (Anderson and 
Gerbing, 1988), and the AVE estimates of the constructs are greater than the squared correlations 
between the corresponding pairs of constructs (Fornell and Larcker, 1981). In addition, we find a 
significant chi-square difference between the unconstrained and constrained models (correlation 
between two constructs set to 1) for all 10 pairs of constructs (Anderson and Gerbing, 1988). For 
example, the chi-square difference between procedural justice and trust ("!2(1) > 34.26, p < .01) 
is significant, similar to that between trust and organizational commitment ("!2(1) > 21.79, p < 
.01). These diagnostics provide strong evidence of discriminant validity. 
5. Analysis and results 
We provide the correlations and descriptive statistics for the study variables in Table 2. 
We use moderated hierarchical regression analysis to test our hypotheses (Cohen and Cohen, 
1983), with a mean-centering procedure for the independent and moderating variables to 
minimize multicollinearity (Aiken and West, 1991). The VIF values are below 3 in all estimated 
models, suggesting that multicollinearity is not an issue in our analyses (Neter et al., 1985). In 
Table 3, we provide the regression results for several models. Model 1 contains only the control 
variables, Model 2 adds the effect of EO, and Model 3 adds the direct effects of procedural 
justice, trust, and organizational commitment. In Model 2, consistent with the starting point of 
our theoretical exposition, we find a positive effect of EO on performance (& = .32, p < .001), 
and the EO variable explains additional variance ('R2 = .092, p < .001). In Model 3, the addition 
of the three social exchange variables further increases the explained variance ('R2 = .174, p < 
.001), suggesting that these factors also affect firm performance. The main effects of procedural 
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justice and organizational commitment are positive and significant, whereas the main effect of 
trust is not significant. 
Insert Tables 2 and 3 about here 
Hypotheses 1–3 predict positive moderating effects of the three social exchange variables 
on the relationship between EO and performance. To test these hypotheses, we add the individual 
interaction terms in Models 4–6 and all interaction terms simultaneously in Model 7. We note 
that each of the interaction terms improves the explanatory power of the models. 
Model 4 reveals a positive and significant interaction effect between EO and procedural 
justice on performance (& = .16, p < .05). To understand the nature of the interaction, we plot the 
effects of EO on performance for high and low levels of procedural justice (Aiken and West, 
1991), as illustrated in Figure 2, Panel A. As the plot suggests, the EO–performance relationship 
is stronger at high levels of procedural justice and negative at low levels. This finding provides 
strong support for Hypothesis 1. In Model 5, the interaction effect between EO and trust on 
performance is positive and significant (& = .19, p < .01), and the corresponding plot in Figure 2, 
Panel B, shows that the EO–performance relationship is stronger at high levels of trust and, 
again, negative at low levels. This finding provides strong support for Hypothesis 2. Finally, in 
Model 6, the interaction effect between EO and organizational commitment on performance is 
positive and significant (& = .15, p < .01). Its plot in Figure 2, Panel C, indicates that the EO– 
performance relationship is positive at high levels of organizational commitment and negative at 
low levels. This finding provides strong support for Hypothesis 3. 
When we include all the interaction terms simultaneously in Model 7, the interaction 
effects, though consistent in sign, become subdued and not significant. We attribute this shift to 
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the different effects that the two-way interactions in Model 7 capture in the presence of other 
two-way interactions.2 Specifically, each of the interaction terms represents the differential effect 
of EO on performance for non-average values of the corresponding moderator (procedural 
justice, trust or organizational commitment), so their simultaneous inclusion implies that each 
moderator only operates in a space that contains the average values of the other moderators 
(Aiken and West, 1991). For example, the moderating effect of procedural justice in Model 7 
reflects situations in which the values of both trust and organizational commitment are average. 
In contrast, in Model 4, the moderating effect of procedural justice covers the full set of values 
for trust and organizational commitment. The lack of significance in Model 7 thus suggests that 
each of the moderating effects is sensitive to the other moderators, in line with the 
configurational hypothesis tested next. 
Hypothesis 4 suggests that when an organization’s social context has higher similarity to 
the ideal configuration of procedural justice, trust, and organizational commitment, the 
relationship between EO and performance will be stronger. In Model 8, we add the main effect 
of the similarity to the ideal configuration to the model that includes the control variables and the 
main effect of EO. The effect of similarity is positive and significant (& = .27, p < .001), 
explaining substantial additional variance ('R2 = .124, p < .001). In Model 9, we add the 
interaction effect of EO and similarity. This effect is positive and significant (& = .10, p < .05). 
We illustrate the effect in Figure 5, which shows the relationship between EO and performance 
for high and low values of similarity to ideal configuration. When similarity is high, the 
2 The simultaneous inclusion of multiple interaction terms may prevent the detection of true moderating effects due 
to multicollinearity and the complex constellation of multiple factors (Aiken and West, 1991; Neter et al., 1985). Yet 
reporting the full model can provide an indication of the robustness of the results (Arnold, 1982; Covin et al., 2006), 
in particular with regard to the consistency of the signs of the interactions compared with those in the models in 
which the interaction terms are included separately. 
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relationship between EO and performance is positive; when similarity is low, EO has virtually no 
relationship to performance. These results provide strong support for Hypothesis 4.  
Insert Figures 2 and 3 about here 
Finally, we undertake several post-hoc analyses to test the robustness of the results. First, 
we split the sample into two halves for each of the three moderators—using the mean as the cut-
off value (Sarin and Mahajan, 2001)—and estimate Models 4–6 for each half. We find that the 
relationships are consistent with the results reported in Table 3. Specifically, the relationship 
between EO and performance is positive and significant at high levels of procedural justice (p < 
.01), trust (p < .001), and organizational commitment (p < .01). At low levels, the relationship 
between EO and performance is weaker and marginally significant for procedural justice (p < 
.10) and not significant for trust and organizational commitment. 
Second, to test whether the effect of the internal social context configuration on the EO— 
performance relationship may work differently for specific pairs of the context’s constitutive 
components, we test three additional regression equations, each containing a three-way 
interaction between EO and a pair of procedural justice, trust, or organizational commitment. We 
find that all three interaction effects are positive, but only two of them—EO # procedural justice 
# trust and EO # procedural justice # organizational commitment—are significant (p < .05 and p 
< .01, respectively). These results reinforce our configuration arguments, because a deficiency in 
any of the three social context components affects either one (or both) of the two three-way 
interactions and thus translates into a weakened EO–performance relationship. They also indicate 
that the presence of fair procedures may be the central component of organizations’ internal 
social context that enhances the successful implementation of an EO into successful 
performance. 
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Third, to assess the possibility that the interactions between EO and the two cross-
functional processes (procedural justice and trust) may influence performance through their 
influence on organizational commitment, we run two sets of pairs of structural equation models. 
Specifically, we compare the fit indices of (1) a model equivalent to Model 4 that includes EO # 
procedural justice and excludes organizational commitment [$2(36) = 70.14, GFI = .95, TLI = .85, 
CFI = .90, RMSEA = .06] with a model that includes organizational commitment as a mediator 
[$2(44) = 114.34, GFI = .93, TLI = .79, CFI = .86, RMSEA = .08] and (2) a model equivalent to 
Model 5 that includes EO # trust and excludes organizational commitment [$2(36) = 69.03, GFI = 
.95, TLI = .85, CFI = .90, RMSEA = .06] with a model that includes organizational commitment 
as a mediator [$2(44) = 112.94, GFI = .93, TLI = .80, CFI = .86, RMSEA = .08]. In both cases, the 
fit of the former models is superior to that of the latter (i.e., '$2 is significant at p < .01), which 
suggests that our models are properly specified. 
6. Discussion 
6.1. Discussion of results 
We advance the notion that a firm’s ability to leverage its entrepreneurial orientation 
(EO) into successful performance depends on internal social exchange processes that facilitate 
knowledge flows across functional departments (Floyd and Lane, 2000; Ireland et al., 2003; 
Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998). This study argues that effective knowledge exchange between 
functional departments—and the associated capability to combine resources necessary for the 
successful exploitation of entrepreneurial opportunities (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; Floyd and 
Lane, 2000; Teece et al., 1997)—depends on the fairness of the procedures that govern the 
relationship between these departments, the trust among functional managers, and the extent to 
which functional managers feel a strong identification with their organization and its goals. 
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We present empirical evidence that such internal social contingencies can enhance or 
diminish the relationship between EO and performance. Our approach thus contributes to the 
scholarly conversation about EO by highlighting the importance of how a firm enacts the internal 
levers of its EO. The effective implementation of an entrepreneurial orientation depends on not 
only the processes through which strategic decisions are made in the organization (Covin et al., 
2006) but also, as we show, the social nature of the processes that link managers to one another. 
We find an overall positive relationship between EO and performance, yet this relationship 
proves nuanced when we consider the nature of several social exchange processes within the 
firm. It is stronger and positive only at high levels of procedural justice, trust, and organizational 
commitment.  
The importance of procedural justice for the EO–performance relationship (Figure 2, 
Panel A) aligns with previous research in the broader management literature, which attests to the 
benefits associated with maintaining fair procedures between exchange partners (Folger and 
Konovsky, 1989; Kim and Mauborgne, 1998; Korsgaard et al., 1995; Sapienza and Korsgaard, 
1996), and adds to our understanding of how EO operates within the firm. Nurturing an open 
exchange of ideas and opinions is encouraged when there is a certain level of procedural justice 
in the interactions between functional departments, which ensures that departmental interests are 
not compromised and that recognition and rewards are properly shared. Such open exchanges in 
turn are instrumental for the effective exploitation of entrepreneurial opportunities (Eisenhardt 
and Martin, 2000; Ireland et al., 2003; Kuratko et al., 2005). In contrast, organizations in which 
functional managers perceive that they are not treated fairly may experience suppression of 
individual initiative and cross-functional collaboration and thus find it difficult to leverage their 
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entrepreneurial potential. Our results indicate that in such cases, performance can be lower at 
higher levels of EO, perhaps due to the disruption that poorly implemented initiatives can create.  
Similarly, our results (Figure 2, Panel B) attest to the benefits of trust for the successful 
exploitation of entrepreneurial opportunities. When functional managers have full confidence in 
one another’s honesty and truthfulness, they experience less need to monitor potential defective 
behavior by others, have more time to invest in extensive knowledge exchange, and exhibit a 
higher motivation to share tacit knowledge (Yli-Renko et al., 2001; Zaheer et al., 1998), which 
facilitates the effective implementation of EO. In contrast, at low levels of trust, the EO– 
performance relationship may turn negative, perhaps due to resistance to relinquish power when 
sharing knowledge (Kim and Mauborgne, 1998), which can be detrimental to the viability of the 
organization’s entrepreneurial opportunities (Floyd and Lane, 2000). In such cases, poor 
knowledge exchange may exacerbate the uncertainty and costs associated with EO (Lumpkin and 
Dess, 1996). 
We observe a similar pattern with respect to the moderating effect of organizational 
commitment on the EO–performance relationship (Figure 2, Panel C). Strong identification with 
their organization reflects functional managers’ willingness to interact intensively and share a 
broad range of knowledge with organizational peers (De Clercq and Sapienza, 2006; Kim, 1998). 
Whereas such interactions appear instrumental for the effective realization of the firm’s EO, a 
lack of organizational commitment may prove counterproductive when, in the absence of strong 
emotional bonds with the organization, functional managers give up more easily in the face of 
the uncertainty or costs associated with entrepreneurial initiatives. 
Beyond the individual moderating effects of procedural justice, trust, and organizational 
commitment, we find a strong holistic, configurational effect of these three aspects of social 
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exchange. Using a systems approach to organizational contingencies, we show that deviation 
from the “ideal” configuration of organizational factors can undermine the effective 
implementation of a firm’s entrepreneurial posture (Drazin and Van de Ven, 1985; Ketchen et 
al., 1993, 1997; Vorhies and Morgan, 2003). The relationship between EO and performance 
holds only when the organization’s social context exhibits higher similarity to the ideal 
configuration of procedural justice, trust, and organizational commitment. We attribute this 
effect to the notion that these elements of the organization’s social context reinforce one another 
in enhancing knowledge flows within the organization and thus channeling entrepreneurial 
orientation efforts toward successful performance (De Clercq and Sapienza, 2006; Floyd and 
Lane, 2000). Although each of these social processes encourages people to cooperate, their 
simultaneous presence makes such cooperation more open, reciprocal, and sustainable (Kim and 
Mauborgne, 1998). If any of these elements of social context is deficient, it can gradually 
undermine the productive, cooperative climate within the organization and ultimately impede 
knowledge exchange when the organization seeks to exploit new opportunities. In short, a 
piecemeal focus on establishing procedural fairness, developing trust, or promoting 
organizational commitment can be ineffective for the success of the firm’s entrepreneurial 
aspirations. 
6.2. Limitations, future research, and practical implications 
We acknowledge several limitations to our study, whose consideration may offer 
opportunities for further research. First, the empirical context pertains to the collaboration 
between R&D-related functions and marketing-related functions. The R&D–marketing interface 
arguably plays a critical role in the implementation of an entrepreneurial posture, in that the 
successful development of new products or new market entry requires an appropriate match of 
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market knowledge and technological know how (De Luca and Atuahene-Gima, 2007; Leenders 
and Wierenga, 2002), yet this context may not be representative of all types of cross-functional 
collaboration taking place within organizations. Although we have no a priori reason to believe 
that the hypotheses developed herein would apply differently to other contexts—such as the 
interaction between R&D or marketing functions on one hand and finance-related functions on 
the other—future research could examine the external validity of our findings to other settings. 
Second, though we focus on only two types of cross-functional processes—procedural justice 
and (goodwill) trust—other factors such as distributive justice (Greenberg, 1990) or competence-
based trust (McAllister, 1995; Olson et al., 2007) could provide additional insights into the 
internal conditions that shape the relationship between EO and performance. Third, the cross-
sectional nature of our data demands caution when drawing causal inferences, because the 
relationships we examine may be susceptible to reverse causality. Although we base our 
hypotheses on extant theory, managers in high-performing firms could become more committed, 
exhibit more goodwill toward their peers, or grow more willing to engage in activities that 
stimulate an entrepreneurial orientation. Further research should elucidate and distinguish among 
various internal causal processes by studying EO and performance over time. Fourth, further 
research could examine whether the interaction effects examined herein work differently across 
different performance outcomes, such as financial, operating, and marketing performance. Fifth, 
our results are based on firms in Canada. Although we do not expect much variation in the 
findings between the Canadian and other Western contexts, cultural factors could interfere with 
the arguments we apply, particularly when the dominant national culture may be at odds with the 
firm’s internal social exchange climate (Hofstede, 2001). 
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Our insights into the importance of intra-organizational social exchange for the 
successful realization of entrepreneurial aspirations also offer important managerial implications. 
When firms prepare to pursue new opportunities, top management should focus not only on the 
nature of the opportunities and navigating the external environments but also on attending to the 
social exchanges that permeate the relationships between key functional managers and 
encouraging the combination of knowledge and skills among them. Enacting rules that govern 
cross-functional collaboration in a fair manner or breeding trust among managers from different 
departments can decrease the odds that functional managers identify themselves as marketers, 
salespeople, product designers, or engineers. Instead, they may start thinking of each other as 
“partners” who share a common interest: the successful realization of the firm’s entrepreneurial 
endeavors. When engaged in strong internal partnerships, they will devote less attention, time, 
and effort to “pie-sharing” activities (i.e., the fight for resources) and more to “pie-expanding” 
activities that benefit all parties. In addition, fostering an atmosphere that inspires commitment to 
the organization and its goals—perhaps through clearly defining and effectively communicating 
the firm’s (entrepreneurial) mission and valuing each manager’s contribution to that mission— 
can create an environment of free expression and knowledge exchange among different 
functional areas that should make the mission more attainable. 
In conclusion, we hope this study directs greater attention to the social contingencies 
through which entrepreneurially oriented firms achieve improved performance. This work offers 
a first attempt to advance understanding of the role of several internal social exchange 
mechanisms in this process and could serve as a stepping stone for a better understanding of how 
firms can translate their entrepreneurial posture into stronger market and competitive positions. 
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Table 1 
Constructs and measurement itemsa 
Factor 
Loading t-Value 
Performance (! = 0.92; CR = 0.92; AVE = 0.55) 
Return on investment 
Return on sales 
Profit growth 
Return on assets 
Overall efficiency of operations 
Sales growth 
Market share growth 
Cash flow from operations 
Firm’s overall reputation 
0.812 
0.826 
0.830 a 
0.854 
0.621 
0.652 
0.629 
0.788 
0.609 
14.411 
15.017 
-
15.484 
10.022 
10.861 
10.398 
13.751 
9.754 
EO (! = 0.81; CR = 0.85; AVE = 0.54) 
My company spends more time on long-term R&D (3+ years) than on short-term 
R&D. 
My company is usually among the first in the industry to introduce new products. 
My company rewards risk taking. 
My company shows a great deal of tolerance for high-risk projects. 
My company uses only “tried-and-true” procedures, systems, and methods. 
My company challenges, rather than responds to, its major competitors. 
My company takes bold, wide-ranging strategic actions rather than minor 
changes in tactics. 
0.605 
0.704 
0.706 
0.683 
0.589 
0.768 
0.802 a 
8.838 
10.747 
11.087 
10.627 
8.764 
12.227 
-
Procedural justice (! = 0.89; CR = 0.89; AVE = 0.62) 
Generally speaking, the procedures used in governing the R&D–marketing 
working relationship… 
allow for requests for clarification or additional information about a decision. 
provide opportunities to appeal or challenge a decision. 
are constructed to hear the concerns of all those who are affected by a decision. 
allow people to collect accurate information for making decisions. 
generate standards so that decisions can be made with consistency. 
0.839 
0.849 a 
0.827 
0.777 
0.614 
15.669 
-
14.992 
13.252 
9.703 
Trust (! = 0.88; CR = 0.88; AVE = 0.61) 
People from the other function can always be trusted to do what is right for us. 
People from the other function always keep the promises they make to us. 
People from the other function are perfectly honest and truthful with us. 
People from the other function are truly sincere in their promises. 
People from the other function would not take advantage of us, even if the 
opportunity arose. 
0.683 
0.739 
0.895 a 
0.835 
0.720 
11.728 
13.362 
-
16.765 
12.931 
Organizational commitment  (! = 0.91; CR = 0.92; AVE = 0.73) 
People feel like “part of the family” in the company. 
People feel a strong sense of belonging to the company. 
Generally, people would be happy to spend the rest of their career with the 
company. 
People feel as if this company's problems are their own. 
0.907 
0.948 a 
0.810 
0.746 
24.519 
-
17.805 
15.143 
a Initial loading was fixed to 1 to set the scale of the construct. 
Notes: CR = construct reliability; AVE = average variance extracted.

a The reported factor loadings pertain to the measurement model in which the five factors are simultaneously 

included. To assess the constructs’ validity further, we also undertake confirmatory factor analysis on each of the

constructs individually and find that all factor loadings are higher than .60. Furthermore, the fit indices for each of

the individual constructs are appropriate: performance (GFI = .96, TLI = .97, CFI = .98, RMSEA = .06, SRMR =

.03), EO (GFI = .97, TLI = .97, CFI = .98, RMSEA = .06, SRMR = .05), procedural justice (GFI = .98, TLI = .96,

CFI = .98, RMSEA = .05, SRMR = .03), trust (GFI = .98, TLI = .97, CFI = .98, RMSEA = .06, SRMR =.03), and

organizational commitment (GFI = .97, TLI = .95, CFI = .98, RMSEA = .06, SRMR = .03).
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1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
Table 2

Descriptive statistics and correlations (N = 232)

Variable Mean St.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Performance 3.52 0.76 1.00 
Entrepreneurial orientation (EO) 3.11 0.75 0.32 1.00 
Procedural justice 3.50 0.80 0.40 0.38 1.00 
Trust 3.38 0.79 0.29 0.32 0.52 1.00 
Organizational commitment 3.57 0.94 0.50 0.50 0.53 0.51 1.00 
Similarity to "ideal" configuration -2.77 1.19 0.48 0.49 0.81 0.83 0.82 1.00 
Company size (log employees) 5.65 1.99 0.13 0.004 0.08 0.05 0.10 0.09 1.00 
Company age (years) 32.87 36.31 -0.02 -0.20 0.04 0.06 0.09 0.08 0.52 1.00 
Type of business (production) 0.32 0.47 -0.03 0.09 -0.02 0.05 -0.01 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 1.00 
Gender (1 = female) 0.12 0.33 0.14 0.10 0.11 0.22 0.21 0.22 0.04 0.03 -0.07 1.00 
Company tenure 9.72 7.94 -0.01 0.003 -0.03 0.02 0.08 0.04 0.43 0.32 -0.05 -0.16 1.00 
Functional area (1=marketing-related) 0.49 0.50 0.14 -0.08 -0.02 0.07 0.03 0.03 0.17 0.19 -0.08 0.03 0.004 
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Table 3 
Ordinary least squares estimation of performance 
 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
                   
Constant 3.106 *** 3.187 *** 3.256 *** 3.219 *** 3.204 *** 3.174 *** 3.174 *** 3.248 *** 3.186 *** 
Company size (log employees) 0.071 * 0.050  0.056 * 0.054 + 0.057 * 0.061 * 0.059 * 0.056 + 0.057 * 
Company age (years) -0.003  -0.0003  -0.003  -0.003 + -0.003 + -0.003 + -0.003 + -0.002  -0.002  
Type of business (production) -0.032  -0.087  -0.024  0.004  -0.014  0.009  0.004  -0.065  -0.043  
Gender (1 = female) 0.305 + 0.220  0.070  0.067  0.040  0.061  0.048  0.052  0.035  
Company tenure -0.002  -0.004  -0.005  -0.004  -0.004  -0.005  -0.005  -0.005  -0.004  
Functional area (1 = marketing-related) 0.194 + 0.214 * 0.186 * 0.197 * 0.210 * 0.207 * 0.213 * 0.180 + 0.200 * 
                   
EO   0.319 *** 0.037  0.044  0.052  0.039  0.046  0.098  0.113  
Procedural justice     0.193 ** 0.221 ** 0.200 ** 0.202 ** 0.205 **     
Trust     -0.057  -0.060  -0.045  -0.057  -0.051      
Organizational commitment     0.323 *** 0.341 *** 0.343 *** 0.370 *** 0.364 ***     
                   
H1: EO ! Procedural justice       0.158 *     0.016      
H2: EO ! Trust         0.189 **   0.100      
H3: EO ! Organizational commitment           0.152 ** 0.093      
                   
Similarity to "ideal" configuration 
               
0.266 
 
*** 
 
0.295 
 
*** 
 
H4: EO x  Similarity to ideal 
configuration                 
0.104 
 
* 
 
                   
F 2.360 *** 5.450 *** 10.030 *** 9.820 *** 10.310 *** 10.410 *** 8.910 *** 10.000 *** 9.860 *** 
R-square 0.063  0.155  0.328  0.346  0.357  0.359  0.364  0.279  0.301  
!R-square     0.092 *** 0.173 *** 0.018 *  0.029 ** 0.031 ** 0.036  ** 0.124 *** 0.022 * 
Notes: Unstandardized coefficients (two-tailed p-values); ***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05; + p < .10.
Figure 1 
Conceptual model of the moderating effects of procedural justice, trust, and organizational 
commitment on the EO–performance relationship 
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Figure 2 
Moderating effects of procedural justice, trust, and organizational commitment on the EO– 
performance relationship 
A. 
B. 
C. 
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Figure 3 
Moderating effect of similarity to ideal configuration of procedural justice, trust and 
organizational commitment on the EO–performance relationship 
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